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999			_c44402 _d44402
001			16802263
003			OSt
005			20221006110058.0
008			110531s2011 enk b 001 0 eng
010			_a 2011023030
020			_a9780521196147 (hardback)
040			_aLibrary of Congress _cAfrica University _bEnglish
042			_apcc
043			_ae-uk---
050	0	0	_aKD1559 1559 WAD 2011 _b.W33 2011
082	0	0	_a346.4202 _223
084			_aLAW021000 _2bisacsh
100	1		_aWaddams, S. M.
245	1	0	_aPrinciple and policy in contract law : _bcompeting or complementary concepts? / _cStephen Waddams.
260			_aCambridge ; _aNew York : _bCambridge University Press, _c2011.
300			_axvii, 248 p. ; _c24 cm.
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 231-238) and index.
505	8		_aMachine generated contents note: 1. Introduction: empire of reason or republic of common sense?; 2. Intention, will, and agreement; 3. Promise, bargain, and consideration; 4. Unequal transactions; 5. Mistake; 6. Public policy; 7. Enforcement; 8. Conclusion: joint dominion of principle and policy.
520			_a"Although presented as being derived from the past, principles in contract law have been subject to constant reformulation, thereby facilitating legal change while simultaneously seeming to preclude it. Principle and policy have been mutually interdependent, propositions not usually being called principles unless they have been perceived to lead to just results in particular cases, and as likely to produce results in future cases that accord with common sense, commercial convenience and sound public policy. The influence of policy has been frequent in contract law, but Stephen Waddams argues that an unmediated appeal to non-legal sources of policy has been constrained by the need to formulate generalised propositions recognised as legal principles. This interrelation of principle and policy has played an important role in enabling an uncodified system to hold a middle course between a rigid formalism on the one hand and an unconstrained instrumentalism on the other"-- _cProvided by publisher.
520			_a"Introduction: empire of reason, or republic of common sense? '[I]f LAW be a science, said Sir William Jones in 1781, 'and really deserve so sublime a name, it must be founded on principle, and claim an exalted rank in the empire of reason'.1 In Goodisson v. Nunn (1792), Lord Kenyon, in dealing with the then very controversial question of when contractual covenants were to be considered independent of each other, was faced with old cases apparently requiring a result that he thought was unjust. He was able to find that the old cases had impliedly been overruled by more recent cases: The old cases... have been accurately stated, but the determinations in them outrage common sense... I am glad to find that the old cases have been over-ruled; and that we are now warranted by precedent as well as by principle to say this action cannot be maintained.2 These two statements, eleven years apart, invite comparison. Both appeal to 'principle', but the word is used with different connotations. Jones spoke of principle as an essential component of the claim of the law - a claim of which Jones evidently approved - to be a rational science. There is no explicit place in this concept for individual judgment on the part of judges or of writers of what legal rules would, on general considerations, be beneficial or desirable in the interests of justice to the parties to a particular dispute or in the interests of society at large in the future. Lord Kenyon, on the other hand, though he also concludes his statement with an appeal to 'principle', was evidently motivated by a desire to avoid injustice to the defendant in the particular case, and to establish a rule that Jones, An Essay on the Law of Bailments, 123 (emphasis in original)"-- _cProvided by publisher.
650		0	_aContracts _zGreat Britain.
650		0	_aContracts _zGreat Britain _vCases.
650		0	_aContracts.
650		7	_aLAW / Contracts. _2bisacsh
856	4	2	_3Cover image _uhttp://assets.cambridge.org/97805211/96147/cover/9780521196147.jpg
906			_a7 _bcbc _corignew _d1 _eecip _f20 _gy-gencatlg
942			_2lcc _cBK MNGCL